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Contracting the Right to Roam 
 
Wallace McNeish and Steve Olivier 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This chapter critically examines the issue of free recreational access to the environment – the 
right to roam, from the perspective of political philosophy. We begin by setting the right to 
roam within a comparative socio-legal context that indicates how ongoing social and 
economic change has moved it to centre stage in the increasingly contested sphere of what 
Rojek (2001; 2010) calls leisure politics. We then move on to consider the political- 
philosophical debate that has traditionally revolved around rights and duties pertaining to 
private property, and the conception of the social contract. In recent decades the emergence 
of environmental ethics – and in particular conceptions of environmental sustainability and 
environmental justice, have added extra dimensions of complexity to the philosophical terrain 
upon which the right to roam is contested. 
Two very different versions of the social contract will be juxtaposed to bring the key 
arguments into high relief. On the one hand we consider Hardin’s influential eco-Hobbesian 
Tragedy of the Commons (2000, [1968]) thesis. This positions human beings as possessive, 
selfish and competitive individuals who will inevitably be responsible for generalized 
environmental degradation, unless their restless desires (including to roam) are held in check 
by a coercive Green Leviathan. On the other hand, we consider Rawls’ A Theory of Justice 
(1971), which constructs social contract theory from a Kantian premise. This holds that 
human beings have the capacity to work cooperatively and reciprocally to reach a publically 
reasoned consensus about the principles of justice through which to allocate rights and duties 
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- including the environmental rights and duties that are integral to the right to roam. In other 
words, for Rawls, human beings have the collective capacity to devise just and fair social 
arrangements that involve a minimum of coercion - indeed this collective reasoning process 
is integral to Rawlsian procedure. 
We will argue that Hardin’s pessimistic, exclusionary and potentially authoritarian 
conclusions are incompatible with the background consensus concerning the allocation of 
rights and duties in liberal democratic societies. Hardin should therefore be rejected in favour 
of an interpretative development of Rawls which views the right to roam as a primary social 
good that is compatible with a conception of justice as sustainable fairness. This ideal can be 
used to inform a fair social contract as the basis of an inclusive environmentally sensitive 
leisure citizenship. Here, the Scandinavian model of allemannsretten points to a progressive 
way forward for meaningful reform. 
 
 
 
 
Life Politics and Allemannsretten 
 
 
 
Changing patterns of employment, welfare and consumption across the global economy have 
meant that leisure and recreation are playing an increasingly important role in identity 
formation, and a key role in the attainment of personal satisfaction, happiness, spiritual 
fulfilment, well-being and health (see e.g., Gammon and Elkington eds., 2015). Sociologists 
have long identified the development of global trends towards expressive or post-materialist 
values (Inglehart, 1990; 2008), whereby self-actualization is sought through life-political 
activities centred upon personal ethical strategies and lifestyle choices (Giddens, 1989; 1991). 
In terms of leisure these are often connected with green spaces and the rural environment, 
where  perhaps  there  remains  an  element  of  unpredictability,  excitement  and  a  sense  of 
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authentic connection to the natural world, which stands in contrast to the controlled, bland 
and sanitized urban world of daily routines of work and home. As Wilson (2000) says: 
 
 
Given the means and sufficient leisure, a large proportion of the populace backpacks, 
hunts, fishes, birdwatches, and gardens… they crowd the national parks to view 
natural landscapes, looking from the tops of prominences out across rugged terrain for 
a glimpse of tumbling water and animals living free. They travel long distances to 
stroll along the seashore, for reasons they can’t put into words. 
(p. 159) 
 
 
 
Recreation and leisure have diversified with growing participation in sports connected to 
“cool” lifestyle sub-cultures such as surfing, mountain biking and skateboarding. There has 
been a concomitant development of tourism to accommodate an ever widening range of 
demands for what were once relatively niche experiences; from the visceral thrills of sky- 
diving, water-skiing and bungee-jumping, through to the more sedate pleasures of wilderness 
trekking, mountain climbing or wild swimming. Clearly, as Spracklen notes, in postmodern 
leisure culture “what matters is the plurality of choices, the freedom to choose and the 
identity it confers” (2013, p. 174). 
The personal significance of leisure and lifestyle to individual life-projects, the 
diversity of recreational activities available and the growing numbers of participants mean 
that conflicts of interest are inevitable. Hence, life politics has increasingly moved from the 
personal realm to dialogue in the public sphere involving political and sub-political actors 
whose focus is upon what Habermas calls “the grammar of forms of life” (1987, p. 392). This 
is no more so than when it comes to land and water use for recreational purposes where 
tensions are generated: 
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 Between the interests of property owners (for privacy and economic utility) and those who 
seek access for recreational purposes; for example, farmers versus campers or walkers. 
 Between those who aim to preserve sustainable biodiversity and natural landscapes, and 
recreationists whose presence may impact negatively upon such goals, for example seaside 
landowners versus jet-skiers. 
 Between individuals and groups engaged in different activities (for example  kayakers versus 
anglers occupying the same space) or even the same recreational activities (for example 
surfers competing for the same waves) (Funck, 2006; Young, 2007; Olivier, 2010; 
MacLennan and Moore, 2011; Morgan-Davies et al., 2015). 
 
 
Variations in national and regional socio-economic contexts, legal-institutional 
frameworks and leisure cultures are important in determining how these tensions are 
addressed and resolved. In relation to the right to roam, Norway, Finland and Sweden currently 
have legislation that is the most permissive in the world. Access rights to the countryside 
environment are areal and universal, with the only caveats being legal obligations to ensure 
that no damage occurs, that privacy be respected, and that economic activity is not disrupted. 
Informal codes of country recreational behaviour (e.g., in Sweden the “golden rules”) are 
combined with education in formal environmental codes. Added to this, participatory 
stakeholder management bodies engage in dialogue to ensure that this system, which is 
popularly conceived as allemannsretten (everyman’s right) works for all the parties concerned 
(Campion and Stephenson, 2014). 
Even in Scandinavia, public access rights have not gone uncontested by private 
property interests (grunneierretten) where farming, tourism and development around popular 
fjord shorelines is concerned. However, the public interest in access has largely prevailed 
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because at the heart of the Nordic conception of citizenship is a deeply embedded tradition of 
outdoors sporting and recreational activity, as embodied in a cultural sensibility towards 
friluftsliv (a simple life in nature) and idrett (purposeful outdoor sporting activity), 
underpinned by the notion of allemannsretten (Sandell and Fredman, 2010). Other national 
states have developed more limited systems of access which are partially areal (specifying 
particular geographic spaces) and partially lineal (centred upon designated pathways), but in 
both theory and practice the tendency has been to privilege landowners’ rights to exclusion 
over public access. 
In the UK, Scotland has pioneered a shift toward the Nordic model with the Land 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, which put free public access to most of the countryside and 
inland water on a statutory basis. This legislation will be supplemented by a Land Reform 
Bill that in 2016 is making its way through the legislative stages of the Scottish Parliament. 
In the rest of the UK, a much more restrictive and piecemeal system of access prevails, and is 
enforced by punitive trespass laws. Historically, private landowners and related interests have 
vigorously contested all attempts at reform – indeed 20 reform bills have failed in the UK 
parliament during the period of the 20
th 
century (Shoard, 1999). The last attempt at reform in 
 
this area – the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, was significantly watered down 
after intense lobbying. Although this Act introduced a conditional right of public access to 
walk upon limited parts of the English and Welsh countryside, 98% of rivers remain out of 
bounds. 
There are currently ongoing campaigns led by organisations such as the Ramblers 
Association, the British Canoe Union, The Land is Ours, and related water and sports 
organisations, for reforms that would move the rest of the UK towards the Scottish, and by 
extension Nordic model. Liberalization is strongly opposed by private interests through, for 
example, the Countryside Landowners Association, the Intrusive Footpaths Campaign, the 
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National Union of Farmers, and various Anglers Associations. As Parker states, land 
governance has historically been “subject to continual, if only periodically visible, resistance 
and contestation and a vigorous, sometimes brutal defence. The issues discussed are rooted in 
deeply political, if modernist notions of equity, justice, liberty and equality” (2002, p. 103). 
In other words, the issues pertaining to the right to roam are inseparable from the realm of 
political philosophy, to which this chapter now turns. 
 
 
 
 
Allemannsretten versus the Green Leviathan 
 
 
 
In political philosophical terms the debate surrounding the right to roam revolves around the 
status of private property - the axiological institution which modern capitalist societies are 
organised around. Social contract theory of the 17
th 
and 18
th 
centuries as articulated with 
different emphases by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, created a pervasive foundation 
myth bound up with the transition from an unbounded property-less and primitive state of 
nature to a bounded propertied and sophisticated society. As Smith argues, the social contract 
“was an agreement to enter into the moral and political order of civilization, to limit one’s 
inherent freedoms and control one’s inherent (selfish) nature in the name of reason and social 
progress” (2011, pp. 67-68). 
Modern analytical political theory and philosophy has evolved around questions of 
justice pertaining to the trade-offs between individual freedoms, their allocations as embodied 
in rights and duties, how they relate to conceptions of citizenship and the notion of what 
constitutes mutual benefit in the good social contract. In the context of the debate 
surrounding the right to roam, this dialogue has traditionally on focused upon the balance 
between the rights of property owners – for example to privacy, economic utility and amenity 
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- and the rights of the public to access that property for recreational purposes. The type of 
property concerned; countryside landscapes and green spaces including rivers, lakes, shores, 
mountains, wilderness, farmland and forests, is clearly different from other property forms 
because of its public nature, and in democratic societies is therefore potentially open to 
challenge from those interest groups who campaign for free access on the basis of public 
interest (Warren, 2002). In straightforward left versus right terms the right to roam is therefore 
“an enduring site of class struggle… with the landless seeking to establish their ‘moral’ 
right to roam in contradistinction to the ‘landed’ seeking to maintain the hegemony of private 
property” (Ravenscroft, 1995, p. 64). 
Over the past few decades, environmental sustainability and environmental justice 
have added extra dimensions of complexity to the right to roam debate that blurs traditional 
left versus right fault lines. As famously defined in the Brundtland Report, development that 
is sustainable “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (1987, p. 8). From the green perspective this 
intergenerational ethical duty must take precedence in all decisions concerning the allocation 
of rights amongst the current generation. This involves a precautionary approach that is most 
loudly articulated in the contemporary demands of the environmental movement to tackle 
global warming. The environmental justice movement’s aim is firstly “to equalize the burdens 
of pollution, noxious development, and resource depletion”  (Shrader-Frachette, 2002, p. 6). 
Secondly, its aim is to equalise access to environmental goods, including the right to roam. 
For example, Wightman has argued that “just as free speech is regarded as a fundamental 
right, so should access… Freedom to roam is the natural condition of humanity” (1996, pp. 
198-99). 
The growing influence of the environmental justice movement can be seen in the 
European Council on Environmental Law’s conclusion in 2006 that free access to nature 
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should be a universal human right. This recommendation was sustained in the 2010 United 
Nations Environmental Programme Draft Declaration on the Environment and Human 
Rights. In its deliberations the European Council concluded that access to nature is “essential 
for physical and psychological health of human beings and a key element of individual and 
social well-being”. It also noted that such access is “acutely threatened by, inter alia, rapid 
urbanization, changing interpretations of property rights, the commodification and parcelling 
of nature and the landscape, increasing alienation of humans from nature and failures in land 
use plans” (Scannell, 2010, p. 229). 
Growing environmental consciousness coupled with sociological trends towards life 
politics has led to an increasing demand for access to nature. As a result, the environmental 
justice movement has successfully moved this issue to the top of the international legal 
agenda, while encouraging numerous localised campaigns across the world for a right to 
roam that mirrors Nordic allemannsretten. Yet paradoxically, this call for environmental 
justice pertaining to access stands in contradiction to the demand for environmental 
sustainability due to the negative impacts that increasing numbers of recreational users and 
their activities will have. It is also the case that the more people who utilize environmental 
amenity and resources – scarce or otherwise – will potentially detract from the recreational 
experience of all those who are sharing the same environment. This paradox was 
(in)famously recognised by Hardin who argues that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all” (2000 [1968], p. 189), the key claim that stands at the heart of his influential “tragedy of 
the commons” thesis. In relation to the right to roam issue he gives the example of: 
 
 
The National Parks…. At present, they are open to all, without limit. The parks 
themselves are limited in extent – there is only one Yosemite Valley – whereas 
population seems to grow without limit. The values that visitors seek in the parks are 
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steadily eroded. Plainly, we must soon cease to treat the parks as commons or they 
will be of no value to anyone. 
(Hardin, 2000 [1968]: 189) 
 
 
 
For Hardin it is not only human experience that is degraded when environmental resources 
are left open to free public access, but more seriously in terms of consequences for 
interconnected human life, it is environmental biodiversity that is inevitably destroyed. He 
uses the game theory metaphor of a pasture held in common which herders inevitably over- 
graze, and points to the way that other common resources such forests are logged to ruin, seas 
are over-fished, and air and land is polluted. Population growth is the main enemy - indeed 
Hardin argues in an explicitly Malthusian manner that “freedom to breed is intolerable”, 
because ever more individuals in a finite eco-system cannot do anything else but enter into 
self-defeating competition for ever dwindling resources. Population density is particularly 
problematic due to the fact that “using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general 
public under frontier conditions, because there is no public; the same behaviour in a 
metropolis is unbearable” (Hardin, 2000 [1968], p. 190). Welfare and human rights pertaining 
to family size compound this problem – no doubt Hardin would be horrified by the right to 
roam recently being designated another such legal human right. 
Hardin’s foundational assumption is a Hobbesian view of human nature whereby 
human beings have infinite desires and diverse appetites that they will always rationally seek 
to maximise at an individual level. Humans are possessed by what Hobbes calls a propensity 
to “felicity”, which in the state of nature leads to a state of war “of every man against every 
man… and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes, 1955 [1651], p. 82). For Hobbes, this 
pre-moral situation is escaped through an application of reason that enables the recognition 
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that peace is of mutual benefit. Peace can only be attained by ‘the covenant of every man 
with every man’ – a social contract – whereby each says to the other “I authorize and give up 
my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, that thou give up thy 
right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner”. This unification signifies the birth 
of the Commonwealth, “the great Leviathan… that mortal god” (Hobbes, 1955 [1651], p. 
112), whose first duty is to institute the law of property as the foundational basis of morality 
in a peaceful civil society. 
Hardin’s solution to the tragedy of the commons is also suitably Hobbesian – he does 
not trust moral imperatives or educational propaganda because free riders will always 
undermine self-regulation – and he categorically rejects Bentham’s utilitarian argument that it 
should be possible “to maximise the greatest good for the greatest number” because 
individual goods are incommensurable. For Hardin, as for Hobbes the aim of the social 
contact is security, and history indicates that this goal will only be achieved by ‘mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority’, exercised by a strong centralized state 
through administrative law which protects extensions of enclosure and private property as 
well as limiting population. From this perspective, allemannsretten like fecundity constitutes 
a legally sanctioned state of nature and should be avoided at all costs. 
Hardin acknowledges that liberals will baulk at his proposals because they run counter 
to dominant conceptions of rights and freedom. He counters liberal objections with an appeal 
to situational ethics whereby ‘the morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at 
the time it is performed’ (Hardin, 2000 [1968], p. 190). This type of relativism can be 
criticised as ethically dubious, but Hardin justifies his Green Leviathan on the ontological 
grounds that it would be more dangerous to not prevent the unfolding environmental tragedy. 
Social stability and human security must be paramount, so in Hardin’s view desperate times 
call for desperate measures. 
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Since its publication in 1968, Hardin’s tragedy thesis has provoked significant debate 
across the social and life sciences in relation to questions of land ownership forms and 
sustainable development, the management of access and the calculation of environmental 
carrying capacity. It has also fed into green political philosophy where it is associated with 
conservative authoritarianism (Dobson, 1997), a position which, given the seriousness of the 
negative impacts of global warming, could become increasingly attractive as its effects become 
ever more apparent. Hardin’s thesis has been widely criticised for perpetuating elitist top-
down technical/managerial approaches to public access which ignore social scientific 
research showing viable living real-world alternatives in the form of collaborative community 
based dialogic approaches (Ostrom, 1990). Williams summarises the main points of critique 
when he argues that Hardin’s thesis “ignores contextual factors such as history and culture, it 
underestimates the ability of people to cooperate in commons situations and it emphasizes 
property rights to the exclusion of other factors” (Williams, 2001, p. 365). In terms of social 
contract theory, the deontological liberal approach developed by Rawls offers the most 
significant and comprehensive alternative to Hardin’s pessimistic authoritarianism. 
 
 
 
 
Allemannsretten and Justice as Sustainable Fairness 
 
 
 
Since its publication in 1971 Rawls’ A Theory of Justice has become a foundational text for 
contemporary welfare state liberalism in much the same way that Marx’s Capital (1867) is 
for the socialist tradition. Its precepts have been debated ad nauseam by scholars, students 
and political commentators, while Rawls himself modified and honed the argument presented 
in follow-up books and revisions of his original thesis (Rawls, 1996; 1999; 2001). It is not the 
intention here to revisit these discussions. Rather, we will briefly explore Rawlsian contract 
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theory in order to identify possible applications and potential extensions which may provide a 
basis for situating the issue of free public access to the environment within a broad 
distributional justice framework that takes account of the ecological concerns that are raised 
by Hardin and environmentalists more generally. 
Rawls’ social contract starts from the Kantian premise that in a society containing free 
and equal individuals, reasonable value plurality concerning religion, morality and 
conceptions of the common good will be irreducible. Therefore, in order to treat individuals 
as ends in themselves, a just social contact must accommodate that plurality so that 
individuals can pursue individual life projects with self-respect and dignity. Again following 
Kant, for Rawls human beings possess a capacity for practical reason, and a capacity to be 
reasonable which are the integral ingredients of a sense of justice that is both reciprocal and 
fair. Hence, given the right conditions, free and equal moral agents recognize that it is 
necessary to agree to disagree with others over reasonable conceptions of the good and to 
cooperate in devising fair first principles of justice that inform “well ordered” stable political 
and institutional arrangements. This enables all to pursue their own reasonable conceptions of 
the good. 
The domain governed by these arrangements as informed by the exercise of public 
reason – what Rawls calls the “basic structure” - is necessarily thin because the overlapping 
consensus will breakdown if it is extended beyond what the contracting parties can agree is 
fair and reasonable. These first principles are of the utmost importance to Rawls conception 
of justice as fairness because they form the background consensus through which key social, 
political and legal institutions are devised and the framework through which life-chance 
determining primary goods are distributed. The initial situation where first principles are 
chosen must therefore ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the contracting 
process (Rawls, 1999, pp. 6-10). 
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It is here that Rawls employs his famous heuristic device whereby an original position of 
equality is imagined in which the contracting parties are cast under a hypothetical “veil of 
ignorance”. Hence “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor 
does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities” or even “their 
conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities” (Rawls, 1999, p. 11). All 
that is assumed of the contracting parties is rationality, mutual disinterest and a sense of 
justice, and all they know is that moderate scarcity defines the economic conditions of the 
society and the primary goods that they are bargaining about. Rawls argues that on this 
original position two key principles of justice as fairness will be agreed by the contracting 
parties: 
 
 
First: each person is to have an equal right of the most extensive scheme of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all. 
(Rawls, 1999: 53) 
 
 
 
These principles are used to determine the basic structure of society, rights, duties and social 
and economic advantages. The first principle of liberty, which is concomitant to the political 
sphere, has lexical priority over the second difference principle, which is concomitant to the 
social and economic sphere. They are applied together in the allocation of primary goods 
which Rawls describes as “the things that every rational man is presumed to want” regardless 
of life project. These include basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement, occupational 
choice, opportunities to hold office in the basic structural institutions, income, wealth and 
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most significantly for Rawls, the social bases of self-respect. Included amongst basic rights as 
primary goods is the right to own personal property. However, Rawls is quite explicit that the 
application of the liberty and difference principles means that this right does not include “the 
right to own certain kinds of property (e.g., the means of production) and freedom of contract 
understood as laissez-faire” (Rawls, 1999, p. 54). As Abplanalp (2010), says in his 
commentary: 
 
 
Free and equal citizens can still develop and pursue a reasonable conception of the 
good without the absolute right to own a phone company or a coal mine. Denying a 
citizen the basic property right to a river or a forest will not undercut the social basis 
of her self-respect. But unlike owning the means of production, personal property is 
undoubtedly required for a reasonable citizen to pursue their conception of the good’. 
(2010, pp. 75-76) 
 
 
 
Rawls distinguishes the index of “social primary goods” from “natural goods” such as “health 
and vigour, intelligence and imagination” that may be influenced by the basic structure but 
are not directly under its control (Rawls, 1999, p. 54). According to Rawls the contracting 
parties will move through a four stage procedural sequence. This process gradually lifts the 
veil of ignorance as the deliberative process moves from first principles, through a 
constitutional convention to a legislature, and finally to a fully operational liberal society 
where public reason is being exercised in accordance to justice as fairness (Rawls, 1999, pp. 
171-76). 
When it comes to the issue of the right to roam, in the Rawlsian contract it could be 
conceived of as being resolved through trade-offs concerning basic freedoms such as freedom 
of movement and the right to hold personal property. A strong case can also be made that the 
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contracting parties would consensually adopt a form of allemannsretten. This would enable 
individuals to pursue reasonable life political goals that involve public access to land and 
water for leisure and recreation purposes, because such goals are an essential basis for the 
attainment of self-respect. However, the environmental issue would remain unresolved unless 
the distribution of environmental goods is included in Rawls’ index of primary goods. Indeed, 
environmental ethicists argue that social systems must be located as operating within a natural 
environment. Hence, natural capital should be understood as a “meta-primary” good 
– “that is, without it none of the other primary goods could exist” (Ashford and Hall, 2011, p. 
66). 
Rawls is often criticised by green political philosophers for developing an irretrievable 
anthropocentric perspective that excludes the natural environment and animal species from 
his framework of justice as fairness (Curry, 2006). Other green theorists have argued that 
there are resources within Rawlsian theory that can be utilised to develop a form of liberal 
ecologism. Most notably, this includes his notion of a just savings scheme that addresses 
the issue of intergenerational justice (Dobson, 1998; Postma, 2006). Under the veil of 
ignorance in the original position the contracting parties do not know to which generation 
they belong. They thus do not know “if it is poor or relatively wealthy, largely agricultural or 
already industrialized” (Rawls, 1999, p. 254). The reciprocity which stands at the heart of 
justice as fairness therefore cannot be limited to the contemporary generation and must be 
applied so that no generation is disadvantaged when it comes to the basic liberties and the 
distribution of primary goods. If the ability to live in a clean and safe environment is added to 
the index of primary goods alongside a public right of access, a background consensus of 
environmental values will inform public policy concerning sustainable practice. 
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Ashford and Hall (2011), suggest that if natural capital is recognised as a primary 
good, and a just saving scheme is adopted, then the contracting parties would add a third 
principle of justice along the following lines: 
 
 
Social arrangements are to be organised so that they: 
 
a) Protect and continually improve the environment, especially for those individuals 
and species most heavily affected by environmental degradation and pollution. 
b) Do not result in actions that exceed ecological carrying capacity. 
 
(2011: 66) 
 
 
 
This third principle would ensure justice as sustainable fairness. Environmentalists might 
argue that this principle should come first in terms of lexical priority - that it should become a 
meta-ethical principle of justice. However, as Ashford and Hall (2011) argue, it should stay 
as third in terms of lexical priority because to do otherwise would disrupt the overlapping 
consensus generated by the first principle that guarantees social stability, and thereby destroy 
the elegance of Rawls’ social contract. This move would also potentially lead back to Hardin’s 
authoritarian solution to the issues of sustainability and public access to the environment – a 
position that stands in direct opposition to liberal principles of justice as fairness, and the 
way that real working liberal democracies are constituted. 
 
 
 
 
Towards an Inclusive and Sustainable Leisure Citizenship 
 
 
 
Right to roam campaigners point to the Nordic model as an example for their own national 
states to follow. They counter objections made on the grounds of non-universalisable cultural 
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specificity by noting that allemannsretten is the product of concrete democratic political 
choices about the nature of citizenship and the significance of outdoor leisure made by the 
Nordic states in the early part of the 20
th 
century. For example, in 1918-19, the Norwegian 
parliament, under pressure from the labour movement in the wake of the Russian Revolution, 
uniquely legislated for leisure with division of the day into three equal eight hour segments 
for work, recreation, and rest. As Riddich argues, “the inclusion of leisure as a state sanctioned 
activity – perhaps even a statutory obligation – had a profound impact on public attitudes” 
(Riddich, 2015, p. 239), and cemented allemannsretten as a key component of recreation 
in the public consciousness. In Sweden, modern allemannsretten was mentioned in 
law for the first time in the 1960s, though its origins can be traced to the 1930s when the 
government decided to revive the ethic of free public areal access in order satisfy the growing 
demand for recreational amenity. Initially opposed by landowners, it was strongly supported 
by the public and had the added advantage of avoiding the expense, and legal complications 
of national park creation (Campion and Stephenson, 2010). 
What the Nordic experience shows is that liberal states can achieve a pragmatic 
democratic consensus that balances the right to roam with the rights of property owners. This 
consensus can be viewed in Rawlsian contract terms as operating at the level of an inclusive 
background value consensus concerning the distribution of primary social goods. 
Allemannsretten and the related friluftsliv, and idrett, are inseparable from Nordic citizenship 
that over time has come to redefine property rights quite differently from the exclusive 
ownership model that remains dominant in other liberal democratic states. While private 
property remains the primary form of land ownership, “rights are commonly viewed as an 
entitlement to benefit from property and not as ownership of the land itself”. Added to this 
conception of property is an emphasis on environmental sustainability so that ‘although 
productive values take precedence on private rural property, there is a strong expectation that 
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private land will also serve recreational and conservation purposes’ (Campion and 
Stephenson, 2010, p. 24). 
Hardin’s Hobbesian Leviathan may appeal to authoritarian Greens who place 
sustainability above all other values, and to landowners who remain wedded to neo-liberal 
property rights. However, the fact that access to nature is increasingly being recognised as a 
human right that works in tandem with environmental justice, illustrates that the consensus on 
this issue is slowly shifting. The Rawlsian social contract, developed to encompass an 
orientation towards the natural world, offers a political justice model from which to inform 
processes aimed at closing the gap between the ideal and the real in relation to the issues of 
free public access and sustainability. 
 
 
 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
 
 
Individuals are increasingly seeking self-actualisation through consumer, ethical and health 
related lifestyle choices in the field of leisure and recreation, leading to situations where 
conflicts of interests concerning the right to roam are inevitable. On the one hand it can be 
argued like Hardin that a libertarian attitude to access results in degradation to both human 
experience and the natural environment, but as this chapter has shown, Rawls’ deontological, 
liberal approach (incorporating Kantian elements) to the social contract is not necessarily 
incompatible with sustainability. 
In short, our argument is that legislators in states where the right to roam remains 
contested ought to adopt a “greened” version of Rawls, arriving at political decisions 
underpinned by democratic consensus, ultimately leading to a modified conception of private 
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property. It is of course not possible to re-create the conditions of Rawls’ hypothetical 
original position, but as Rawls indicates in Political Liberalism (1996): 
 
 
The OP serves as a means of public reflection and clarification. It helps us work out what we 
now think, once we are able to take a clear and uncluttered view of what justice requires 
when a society is conceived as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal citizens from 
one generation to the next. 
(p. 26) 
 
 
 
Applied to the right to roam issue, Rawls heuristic device can be used to inform the creation 
of formal and informal fora which enable all stakeholders to engage in dialogue that can lead 
to mutual recognition of the diverse interests at play, and thereby facilitate reasoned 
consensus formation about rights and duties. Here it might also be suggested that Habermas’ 
conception (1992) of the open-ended communicative dialogue with its procedures aimed at 
removing power differentials amongst the parties involved to construct an ideal speech 
situation, compliments the Rawlsian approach. Habermas, like Rawls points to the ideal-type 
of democratic process through which the release of public reason might operationalized in 
relation to the right to roam issue 
In the messy, far from ideal real world, allemannsretten is the most progressive living 
example of how the rights and duties of co-agents can be balanced through dialogic processes 
involving all stakeholders to reach consensus. The experience of the Nordic states shows in 
practice, that only by the public being in nature, can a leisure culture be developed in which 
the public learns to respect nature as citizens of an environment that is intrinsically linked to 
their  status  of  citizens  of  a  democratic  society.  This  cultivation  of  a  sense  of  shared 
20  
ownership, and therefore shared responsibility, is surely the first step towards establishing an 
inclusive, fair and environmentally sustainable leisure citizenship. 
21  
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